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The evolutionary persistence of symbiotic associations is a puzzle. Adaptation should eliminate
cooperative traits if it is possible to enjoy the advantages of cooperation without reciprocating -
a facet of cooperation known in game theory as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Despite this barrier,
symbioses are widespread, and may have been necessary for the evolution of complex life. The
discovery of strategies such as tit-for-tat has been presented as a general solution to the problem
of cooperation. However, this only holds for within-species cooperation, where a single strategy
will come to dominate the population. In a symbiotic association each species may have a different
strategy, and the theoretical analysis of the single species problem is no guide to the outcome. We
present basic analysis of two-species cooperation and show that a species with a fast adaptation
rate is enslaved by a slowly evolving one. Paradoxically, the rapidly evolving species becomes
highly cooperative, whereas the slowly evolving one gives little in return. This helps understand the
occurrence of endosymbioses where the host benefits, but the symbionts appear to gain little from
the association.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation between endosymbionts and their hosts is
most striking in the common case where the symbiont
can survive in a free-living form and each host is infected
anew in its infancy [1, 2, 3]. If the host is unable to re-
spond to individual symbionts who do not contribute to
the association, then free-riders will prosper and the sym-
biont will ultimately become parasitic on its host [4, 5].
On the other hand, if the host is able to punish defect-
ing symbionts, the expectation is that a “you scratch
my back, and I’ll scratch yours” relationship will develop
[6, 7]. It is supposed that the reciprocation of both co-
operation and defection maintains a mutualistic relation-
ship, from which both parties benefit. This appears to be
supported by game-theoretic analyses of simple models of
cooperation, with tit-for-tat strategies being successful in
Prisoner’s Dilemma scenarios [8, 9, 10]. Although tit-for-
tat emerges as the winning strategy under a wide range
of conditions, most studies of cooperation are restricted
to intra-specific competition. It is not clear that this can
be generalized to the host-endosymbiont system, where
the Prisoner’s Dilemma occurs between two species.
In natural systems, it is found that many horizontally
transmitted non-obligate endosymbionts apparently gen-
erate large benefits for their hosts. Examples include
nitrogen fixation by rhizobial bacteria in legumes [11];
enhanced uptake of nutrients due to mycorrhizal fungi
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[12]; carbon uptake by green algae in many aquatic in-
vertebrates, such as the zooxanthellae of corals [13]; and
bioluminescence provided by bacteria in squid and fish
[14]. Surprisingly, in very few cases have endosymbionts
been shown to benefit significantly from their interac-
tions with host organisms [15]. For example, Rhizobia
reproduce happily enough when free-living in the soil, but
most of these bacteria hardly reproduce at all once inside
the root nodules of legumes [11, 16]. For the putative
benefits of symbiotic life as zooxanthellae, dinoflagellates
give up their cell wall and their flagella, sacrifice most
of their photosynthetic products, and reduce their repro-
ductive rate [17]. The non-obligate forms of endomycor-
rhizal fungi can be readily grown alone, and there is no
evidence for a fitness-related benefit from symbiosis for
them [12]. In particular, there is no evidence that carbon
flows from the plant to the fungus in return for the nutri-
ents these endosymbionts provide. Thus notions of host
and parasite appear to be turned on their head, and this
asymmetry is not explained by the standard tit-for-tat
solution to the problem of cooperation.
Most previous models of cooperation have only repre-
sented one population. In this paper we present a simple
model of a two-species association based on reciprocal
altruism, and explore whether it can explain both the
maintenance of symbiotic relationships and the apparent
enslavement of the symbionts by their hosts. In keeping
with much previous work on the evolution of coopera-
tion, we formalize the Prisoner’s Dilemma in terms of
the costs, c, and benefits, b, of cooperative acts. The
species have variable degrees of cooperation, depending
on the value of these parameters [18, 19, 20, 21]. The
degree of cooperation adopted by each species is subject
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FIG. 1: Linear reactive strategies for H . Each line is a
possible mapping from s to h, parameterized by H0 and H1.
to evolutionary change. The challenge is then to demon-
strate that a mutualistic relationship is stable in the face
of mutations in the parameters governing cooperation.
A core asymmetry between the host and the endosym-
bionts is that the symbionts have a shorter generation
time. This rapid turnover allows their population to re-
spond quickly to changes in the hosts’ behavior. A conse-
quence of this differential adaptive rate is that the tit-for-
tat strategy is no longer optimal. Rather the endosym-
biont becomes fully cooperative and the host becomes
miserly, adopting a level of cooperation just high enough
to maintain the symbiont cooperation. The differential
rates of adaptation appear to lead directly to the differen-
tial pay-offs inferred from studies of host-endosymbiont
systems.
II. MISERS AND SLAVES
In this section we consider just a pair of agents that
interact, to illustrate the idea that a slower rate of adap-
tation can be advantageous. This appears closely related
to the Red King effect [22], although that model specifi-
cally avoids treating the Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario, in
which there is a constant temptation to defect on cooper-
ative agreements. In later sections we apply this notion
to a model of endosymbiosis.
Consider two agents S and H , later we will interpret
these as symbiont and host. Suppose that S adopts some
behaviour to a degree s at a cost to itself of cs per unit,
and a benefit to H of bs→h per unit. For example, this
could be nitrogen fixation by Rhizobia which makes ni-
trogen available to legumes in a useful form, but which
entails a metabolic cost to the Rhizobia. Suppose that H
can also adopt some behaviour h between zero and one.
This benefits S by bh→s at a cost of ch per unit. The net
payoff to S from the association is then
ws = bh→s h − cs s (1)
while that to H is
wh = bs→h s − ch h (2)
For the purposes of our model we take s and h to be
bounded below by zero and above by one. That is, we
assume there is some natural limit to the amount of help
that one organism can provide another. If benefits exceed
costs for both parties, the maximum total payoff, ws+wh,
is achieved when both s and h are at their maximum
values. However any non-zero s or h only benefits the
other party, and so is an altruistic act of cooperation.
By reducing the level of cooperation, an agent reduces
the costs, and so there is an incentive for each agent to
defect. This selfish behavior results in the payoff to each
agent decreasing and we have what is known in game
theory terms as a Prisoner’s Dilemma [7].
To provide an incentive for S to cooperate, H ’s be-
haviour needs to depend on s in some way, and the sim-
plest non-trivial contingency is linear, h = H0 + (H1 −
H0)s. Here H0 is the response to complete defection
(s = 0) and H1 is the response to complete cooperation
(s = 1). Parameters H0 and H1 lie between zero and
one, ensuring that h also lies in this range. The differ-
ence H1 −H0 can be thought of as the ‘responsiveness’
of H . Completely unresponsive agents have H0 = H1 ,
extreme cases being the naive cooperator Always Coop-
erate (1,1) and the stalwart defector Always Defect (0,0).
For unresponsive agents, h is independent of s and the
gradient ∂ws/∂s is −cs , so S is motivated to decrease its
level of cooperation. In contrast, the Tit-for-Tat strategy
(H0, H1) = (0,1) is as responsive as possible (see fig. 1).
In this case we have h = s and ∂ws/∂s = bh→s − cs > 0,
so S should cooperate more to increase its payoff. Notice
that this argument does not depend on specifying the de-
tails of S’s strategy (meaning the way it arrives at the
value s, given h) - it merely indicates whether S should
increase or decrease the level of cooperation it adopts
with H in pursuit of greater payoffs.
More generally, substituting the expression for h into
the payoff for S and differentiating with respect to s,
shows that S is motivated to cooperate as much as it
can, provided that the following ‘incentive condition’ is
met,
H1 −H0 >
cs
bh→s
. (3)
This defines two regions on a plot of H1 versus H0 (see
fig. 2). If H ’s responsiveness is too low, S would ben-
efit from lowering its level of cooperation, while if H ’s
responsiveness is above the threshold cs/bh→s, S should
become as cooperative as it can. Now consider a sce-
nario in which S adapts its strategy over time in pursuit
of higher payoffs. If the incentive condition (eq. 3) is not
met, s will decrease to zero. In particular, any flat re-
sponse (H0 = H1) by H will lead to pure defection by S,
and consequently cannot account for the persistence of a
mutualistic association between them. Conversely, if the
incentive condition is met, s will rise to one.
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FIG. 2: (a) The space of strategies for H . Inside region I
(unshaded) we have H1 − H0 > cs/bh→s, which means that
the optimal reply strategy is complete cooperation. In region
II (shaded) the opposite holds, leading to pure defection. The
dots mark the positions of named Prisoner’s Dilemma strate-
gies. (b) The payoff for H , plotted on the same axes, assum-
ing that S is adaptive enough to adopt the optimal reply be-
haviour. Contours (dotted lines) show H ’s payoff and arrows
show the direction of steepest ascent. The numbers shown
are for the specific case of c = 1, b = 4 for both parties. The
point on this surface with the highest payoff corresponds to
the miser strategy of (0, (cs/bh→s)
+).
Now consider the effect of this on H . The payoff to an
H agent whose responsiveness is above the threshold will
be bs→h− chH1 (since s = 1), compared to −chH0 for an
H below the threshold (since then s = 0). Since benefits
outweigh costs bs→h − chH1 > 0 and so all H strategies
above the threshold out-compete those below it. The
best possible strategy for H will be the one with lowest
H1 that still obeys the incentive condition. This strategy
has H0 = 0 and H1 just above cs/bh→s (it needs to be
just above to ensure a strictly positive gradient for s).
Equivalently, the optimal strategy for H is to cooperate
with S at a level
hmiser =
(
cs
bh→s
s
)+
(4)
where the superscript (+) means ‘just above’. The con-
clusion is that the best strategy to adopt when faced with
an optimally adaptive co-player is that of a ‘miser’. The
miser reacts with just enough cooperation to encourage
the other agent to cooperate more. With H1 at cs/bh→s
the miser collects a payoff of bs→h − csch/bh→s, which
is not much less than the maximum payoff of bs→h ob-
tainable by pure defection against the sucker strategy Al-
ways Cooperate. By contrast, the highly adaptive agent
is induced to cooperate at the maximal level and for this
receives a payoff only marginally above zero. If H is able
to adapt but does so at a significantly lower rate than S,
we might expect a miser-slave relationship to arise and
be stable. This phenomenon has been noted in simula-
tions of the prisoner’s dilemma, although in that case the
model involved was not amenable to analysis [23].
It might be argued at this point that the preceding
model is biased, in that the H strategies are responsive
whereas S just assumes a fixed level of cooperation. The
S’s are not given access to the same repertoire of strate-
gies as the H strategies, and so perhaps their enslave-
ment is due merely to this built-in deficiency. To show
that it occurs in the same way when both players may
change their strategies, introduce the parameters S0 and
S1. The level of cooperation is s = S0 + (S1 − S0)h and
we have a simple linear dynamical system in which h de-
pends on s, which depends on h itself. The dynamics
have a single attractor that is approached rapidly, re-
gardless of whether h and s are updated synchronously
or asynchronously [18]. This point is
h∗ = α[H0 + S0(H1 −H0)], (5)
s∗ = α[S0 +H0(S1 − S0)], (6)
where α = [1 − (H1 − H0)(S1 − S0)]
−1. Geometrically,
the point (h∗, s∗) is simply the intersection of the two
strategies plotted on the unit square. On fig. 1, an S
strategy maps h back to s and must be a line from the
top of the figure to its base, crossing theH strategy at one
point. Successive updates move the joint state towards
this intersection point and convergence to equilibrium is
rapid (e.g. of the order of 10 to 20 responses). The final
levels determine the payoff that agents receive, namely
w∗
h
= bh→ss
∗
− chh
∗, (7)
w∗s = bs→hh
∗
− css
∗, (8)
and similarly for S. If the player S evolves its strat-
egy sufficiently rapidly, then it is straightforward to show
that the incentive condition is unchanged by this exten-
sion.
4FIG. 3: Hosts and their endosymbionts. Hosts compete with
hosts, and symbionts compete with other symbionts in the
same host, as indicated by the arrows.
III. HOSTS AND SYMBIONTS
So far we have discussed just two agents and assumed
that both adapt their behaviour, with one of them (S)
adapting much more rapidly. It is interesting to speculate
whether this phenomenon might occur between two co-
evolving populations, and specifically between hosts and
their endosymbionts. In an endosymbiotic relationship,
the lifespan of the host is longer than that of the sym-
biont. Each of the partners generates payoffs via interac-
tions with the other type, yet uses these to competitively
replace only their own type. A single host typically con-
tains many endosymbionts, and these replicate within the
host for many generations. In the remainder of this paper
we use computer simulations to explore the idea that the
preceding analysis of agents H and S applies similarly to
hosts and endosymbionts. The intent is not to present
a detailed model of a specific host-endosymbiont system,
but to examine in general terms whether this mechanism
can be applicable.
Our model (shown schematically in fig. 3) is intended
to capture the simplest aspects of endosymbiotic asso-
ciations. We assume purely horizontal transmission of
symbionts, since this is the situation that is most puz-
zling. Each host organism acquires endosymbionts from
the environment at some point in its early life, and a
symbiotic association is formed anew with each genera-
tion. The host harbors its symbionts for some period,
during which the symbionts reproduce with mutations.
We assume that symbionts compete for limited resources
within each host, leading to traits associated with greater
symbiont payoffs becoming more prevalent over time.
Hosts are also in a competitive environment, albeit one
that occurs over a longer time-scale. For simplicity we
assume that variations in fitness are due solely to the
host-endosymbiont association.
Specifically, we model a population of 100 individuals
of a host species denoted H , each with parameters (H0,
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FIG. 4: Examples of the evolution of endosymbionts within
a single host. The solid lines and circles show results for
symbionts within a host with a strategy in region I of fig. (2),
H0 = 0.02, H1 = 0.15. The dashed lines and squares show
results for a symbionts associated with a host in region II,
H0 = 0.02, H1 = 0.05. (a) A timeline of the average payoffs
received by the symbionts. (b) The evolution of the symbiont
strategies, showing the trajectory of the mean values of the
parameters S0 and S1. The symbols show the strategies at
the end of the 25 generation simulation. There is initially a
rapid change in S0, followed by a slower change in S1.
H1). Each host has an exclusive association with its own
population of 25 symbionts, denoted S, and each such
symbiont has a strategy (S0, S1). In our simulations
the population sizes are fixed: introducing fluctuating
populations would require additional assumptions (about
carrying capacities for instance).
All the evolvable parameters (H0, H1 for hosts and
S0, S1 for symbionts) were started with random values
between zero and one. Each host applied its strategy
5of contingent cooperation in interacting with each of its
symbionts on an individual basis, resulting in payoffs as
described above. For simplicity, the simulations shown
here used the same costs and benefits for both types of
creature (cs = ch and bh→s = bs→h). A very simple
model of competitive replacement was used to simulate
the effect of natural selection, as follows. For symbionts,
two individuals were chosen at random from a single
host. The payoff to each individual was calculated us-
ing eqs. (8), but with a small amount of random noise
(uniformly distributed in the range ±0.01) being added.
The symbiont with lower fitness (payoff) was then deleted
and replaced by the other. Rather than perfect replica-
tion of the better strategy, mutations were introduced by
adding random noise uniform in the range ±0.01 to each
parameter as it was copied, while constraining them to
remain within zero and one. This allowed new strategies
to arise that were not present in the original population.
Exactly the same procedure was applied to competition
between hosts. We refer to N replacements, where N
is the size of the relevant population, as one generation.
Endosymbionts underwent 25 such generations per host
replacement, and the simulation was run for 100 host
generations. The fitness of a given host was taken to be
the sum of the payoffs from its interactions with all its
endosymbionts at the end of 100 endosymbiont genera-
tions. Each new host began life with randomly generated
new endosymbionts. This reflects the fact that the most
difficult case to understand is horizontal transmission,
where symbionts exist in a free-living form and infect
hosts anew with each generation. Horizontal transmis-
sion also appears to be the most common mode of main-
taining symbiont-host associations [1].
Within each host, the symbionts evolve towards either
full cooperation or defection, depending on whether the
host strategy is in region I or II of fig. 2. The examples
in fig. 4 show the evolution of the symbionts within two
hosts, one slightly more cooperative than the miser strat-
egy, and one slightly less cooperative. There is initially a
rapid change in the symbiont strategies, towards S0 = 1
and S0 = 0, respectively. The change in S1 is slower,
because in the example given H0 is small. As expected,
the payoff to the symbionts within a host increases with
time.
At the end of the full simulation the miser strategy
dominated the host population and most endosymbionts
adopted strategies very close to unconditional coopera-
tion (see fig. 5). After an initial transient, lasting for
around 20 host generations, the average payoff to the
endosymbionts remained at less than one tenth of the
averaged payoff to the hosts. Note that the payoff to the
symbionts decreases as the hosts evolve. Occasionally
a mutation would take a host across the boundary into
the region which is too non-cooperative, this host’s sym-
bionts would then stop cooperating, the payoff to the host
would fall, and it would be eliminated from the popula-
tion through the selection process. The asymmetry in the
rewards of the association remains even at low cost-to-
FIG. 5: Coevolution of hosts and endosymbionts. (a) A time-
line of the average payoffs received by hosts and symbionts (b)
A random sample of the strategies present at the end of the
simulation (to be compared with fig. 2).
benefit ratios (fig. 6). As c approaches zero there is little
cost to cooperation and hence little incentive to defect,
and yet the degree of miserliness becomes increasingly
severe. Similar results are achieved if the symbionts do
not respond to the host (i.e. if the constraint S0 = S1
is applied). In order to maintain the cooperation of the
symbionts the host strategy must be responsive. In a
simulation which imposed both S0 = S1 and H0 = H1
the hosts and the symbionts both rapidly adopted strate-
gies close to All Defect, with little payoff to either party.
Similarly, if the host responds not to the individual sym-
bionts but rather to an averaged level of cooperation,
then mutual defection rapidly ensues.
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FIG. 6: The average payoffs to hosts (triangles) and sym-
bionts (filled circles), versus the cost-benefit ratio, with b = 1,
where both species experience the same cost and benefits.
The solid line indicates the predicted payoff for miserly hosts
containing fully cooperative symbionts, b− c2/b.
IV. THREE MODERATING INFLUENCES
The argument given here makes a number of simplify-
ing assumptions, some of which accentuate the degree of
miserliness. In real systems we might expect somewhat
less extreme outcomes for the following reasons.
Firstly, the model assumes that once symbionts enter
a host they are trapped there, at least until the host dies.
Clearly things will be different if they’re free to go. One
can draw the analogy with sets of companies and their
employees: for the worker there is a tradeoff between
staying (with poor but secure working conditions) and
going in search of greater prosperity with another em-
ployer, entailing some risk associated with the transfer
(i.e. the costs and risks of transit itself, and the possibil-
ity that the new host/employer is even worse). On the
other hand, this implies some selection pressure in favour
of barriers or other ‘exit costs’ that hosts might be ex-
pected to impose on their workforces. For example, the
‘walling in’ of Rhizobia in the root nodules of legumes
may merely enhance the uptake of fixed nitrogen by the
plant, but it also could be argued that it plays a role in
preventing the bacteria from leaving.
Secondly, all hosts in the simulation contain the same
number of symbionts. One might instead expect the car-
rying capacity within more miserly hosts to be lower, in-
directly decreasing their fitness. In general, hosts should
evolve to be as miserly as possible while still retaining suf-
ficient numbers of sufficiently compliant endosymbionts.
Finally, the model of selection employed here is a bru-
tal one, and this makes the division between regions I
and II (fig. 2) particularly stark. As a host approaches
the miser strategy the gradient in fitness being followed
by its endosymbiont population becomes flatter and flat-
ter, and at the miser strategy itself the gradient is zero
and so they spread out everywhere. If the endosymbionts
aren’t responding strongly to the host strategy, the host’s
gradient disappears as well. Again we have a trade-off:
a given host wants to be as miserly as possible while en-
suring that differential incentives continue to encourage
cooperation strongly enough.
Against these points, however, the inheritance regime
used in our simulations makes it difficult for hosts to
evolve cooperation in their symbionts. Here each host
begins life with an assortment of endosymbionts with
randomly chosen strategies. Increased levels of symbiont
cooperation are never passed on - they must be evolved
anew with each generation. More realistic models might
allow the new generation of hosts to begin with endosym-
bionts chosen from the generation before. This could
take the form of vertical inheritance (in effect, perpet-
uating the ‘walling in’ across generations), or else sym-
bionts might be expelled to the external environment and
reacquired by new hosts. In either case, it will be easier
to evolve full cooperation from symbionts, enhancing the
tendency towards miserliness in hosts.
V. DISCUSSION
A theme of recent work on symbiosis has been the sur-
prising richness and complexity of the entanglement be-
tween host and symbiont, in which the partners undergo
substantial metabolic and morphological changes medi-
ated by a complex series of mutual signals, even modu-
lating one another’s gene expression [24]. It is clear that
a model of the simplicity described here ignores many
potentially relevant biological details. Its role is to show
that, in principle, a low pay-off by the host may be suffi-
cient to coerce a population of endosymbionts into nearly
complete cooperation. An assumption of both the theo-
retical analysis and the model is that the host is able to
respond to individual symbionts, preferentially reward-
ing those who cooperate. Perhaps the complexity of the
real-life symbiotic dialogue concerns the host’s efforts to
detect and respond at a local scale to the efforts of its
symbiont passengers. The punishment of defecting sym-
bionts may not require the host to differentiate individual
symbionts, however. Suppose, for example, that a host
species is well served by symbionts that convert some
compound X into some other compound Y . Even if the
host is unable to reward the production of Y at a local
scale, it can punish endosymbionts that don’t carry out
the reaction by flooding the area with something that’s
toxic to them in the presence ofX , or toxic in the absence
of Y . A mechanism like this potentially allows a single
host to interact with an essentially arbitrary number of
symbionts at the same time.
The theory proposed here accounts for both the per-
sistence of host-endosymbiont mutualisms and the ob-
served asymmetry in their benefits, as well as suggesting
a role for the complex host structures now being found in
many associations. The very different dynamics found in
a two-species interaction, when compared with the usual
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, suggests that there is still
7much to be discovered about cooperative associations.
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